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Book Review 
 
Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility To Protect: A Defense (Oxford, 2015). 
 
As the humanitarian crisis in Syria continues, the debates surrounding the utility of 
the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) proliferate.  If R2P is a defendant on trial, it 
wants Alex J. Bellamy as its defence attorney.  One of the most provocative aspects of 
Bellamy’s book is his idealism surrounding R2P’s implementation problems.  Despite 
the reality that R2P intervention is dependent on political and prudential 
considerations among the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) Permanent Five 
(P5), Bellamy explains that this is the sacrifice for widespread consensus on R2P.  In 
other words, where there is a failure to implement the R2P principle due to the myriad 
political interests and constraints of the P5, the principle still enjoys ‘buy-in’ by a 
large number of states.  This existing commitment to the R2P principle among states, 
in contrast to the lack of implementation of R2P on the ground (due to political 
gridlock within the UNSC), exposes the principle’s fundamental weakness as a norm.  
This dichotomy is both necessary and troubling.  Strong consensus on R2P is 
necessary for the principle to continue existing, but the resulting weakness of the 
norm requires further elaboration. 
 
First, Bellamy’s defence claims we must clarify what R2P is before we judge its 
success and failure.  He says it is a principle made up of at least two norms, one 
recognisable in the legal world (states’ responsibilities towards their own populations) 
and one newer principle that can be described as political (international 
responsibilities that transcend sovereignty).  This may be true, but it is hard to remain 
positive about R2P’s widespread consensus here.  While all states may embrace the 
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legal aspect of R2P concerning the inviolability of sovereignty, it cannot be said that 
there is such extensive consensus on the newer political notion of intervening despite 
sovereignty.  Bellamy’s reliance on R2P’s widespread consensus is overstated 
because it does not lead to consensual action on the ground.  Most likely, states 
bought into the R2P principle because it was safe to do so: The principle is not legally 
binding; it has a lot of wriggle room for states to decide what to do on a case-by-case 
basis; and no country would condemn a principle that is concerned with innocent 
people facing mass atrocity when they are not promising any specific action on their 
own part.  The debatable global acceptance of R2P does not signify its 
implementation on the ground.  
 
Second, in judging R2P’s true success, Bellamy claims it is an authentic and robust 
‘identity changer’ as states have ‘internalised the values of less tolerance for mass 
atrocities and the notion that such acts are worthy of international concern’.  R2P 
failures (due to political indifference or lack of consensus), followed by international 
condemnation, serve as Bellamy’s proof of this identity change.  His example of such 
‘universal criticism’ of inaction is the General Assembly’s decision to ‘censure the 
Security Council over its failure to protect civilians in Syria’.  Indeed, this deserves 
positivity on both sides of the R2P debate.  However, such international 
condemnation has not translated into action on the ground in the name of R2P.  
Bellamy admits that we are unfortunately left with cases like Sri Lanka, Darfur, and 
Syria, the implementation nightmares of R2P.  In a classic lawyerly move to defend 
his client, Bellamy uses the analogy of criminal offenders that evade detection and/or 
punishment under domestic law with the caveat that we would not repeal criminal 
laws just because a few guilty go free.   
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Even though Bellamy puts forward a good case for R2P, the real worry is the 
persistence of these ‘troublesome cases’.  The cliché of ‘never again’ may have taken 
on a new meaning after Libya.  While the book spends ample time discussing the 
controversial intervention in Libya, there is lack of emphasis on the role the Libya 
intervention has played subsequently in Syria and elsewhere.  ‘Never again’ appears 
to now mean no future UNSC agreement on R2P action especially in Syria.  While 
Russia and China were ‘deeply concerned’ regarding the humanitarian crisis in Libya, 
the military intervention and ensuing regime change have now prevented any 
consensus among the P5 in relation to the current humanitarian crisis in Syria.  While 
Russia’s veto against intervention in Syria may be self-interested, China offers 
another perspective.  China continues to veto action in Syria but has no political or 
economic interest in the Assad regime and has been propagating ‘Responsible 
Protection’ as a cure to its increasing distrust of R2P.  According to an article by 
Stuart Gottlieb, Russia’s former president Dmitry Medvedev vetoed UNSC 
resolutions concerning Syria to avoid another Libya-type intervention.1  Furthermore, 
a P5 agreement on restraint in the use of the veto is unlikely given opposition by 
many of the P5.  Given such political friction and cynicism, it is likely that more 
Syria- type cases will persist as a result of the Libya intervention, so Bellamy’s 
shortlist of troubling cases may become the norm and not the exception.   
 
Bellamy’s consistent theme of R2P’s enjoyment of world consensus as a security 
against R2P becoming obsolete is overstated.  Such consensus, while necessary and 
positive, still does not translate into action on the ground especially post-Libya. Thus, 
																																																								
1 Stuart Gottlieb, ‘Syria and the Demise of the Responsibility to Protect’, The National Interest, 5 November 2013,  
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/syria-the-demise-the-responsibility-protect-9360, accessed 1 December 2014. 
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widespread consensus cannot cure the implementation problems of R2P.  Even so, 
Bellamy is right that R2P is the only current anti-mass atrocity principle, and if one 
applies the ‘veil of ignorance’ he borrows from philosopher John Rawls, I too, would 
rather live in a world where there is a possibility of collective action to protect people 
from mass atrocities. 
Chloë M. Gilgan 
University of York 
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